In the wake of U.S. President Donald Trump’s warnings of possible military intervention in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar – America’s closest regional allies – have firmly opposed such an option. Beyond rejecting military action, these three regional powers appear to be tacitly counting on the survival of the Islamic Republic. But why?
For years, Iran has maintained antagonistic relations with both Turkey and most Arab states. Moreover, the weakening of the Islamic Republic in recent years has, in several cases, benefited these countries. Nevertheless, none of their leaders wants the collapse of the theocratic regime in Tehran. Their primary and shared concern is the instability that would likely follow such a development, instability marked by uncontrolled insecurity and regional spillover.
Turkey, in particular, has much to lose from a scenario of state collapse in Iran. A prolonged period of violence and political chaos would almost certainly trigger a new refugee crisis, the bulk of which would be borne by Turkey. At the same time, Ankara fears the outbreak of a Kurdish uprising in northwestern Iran, potentially involving groups with longstanding ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Such a development would exacerbate Turkey’s concerns about the emergence of a contiguous Kurdish autonomous belt across its borders. After the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (also known as Rojava), the last thing Turkey wants is the creation of a Kurdish polity in Iran.
Additionally, Ankara is wary of a possible Israeli presence in a post-theocratic Iran. Such a development would constrain Turkey’s strategic reach in the Middle East and could intensify security dilemmas associated with Turkey’s longstanding “encirclement syndrome.” Finally, the collapse of the Iranian state would likely disrupt Turkey–Pakistan and Turkey–China land connectivity projects, which are key components of Ankara’s regional economic and strategic ambitions.
Saudi Arabia and Qatar are primarily concerned about potential disruptions to energy markets and the risk that a major crisis in Iran could spill over into their own societies. They also fear a long-term Israeli presence in the Persian/Arabian Gulf, which would further destabilise the already fragile regional security balance.
Saudi Arabia has additional reasons for concern. Without the degree of control Iran currently exercises over its proxies, Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement (the Houthis) could act independently and once again pose a direct threat to the Kingdom. Until the normalisation of relations between Riyadh and Tehran, the Houthis frequently targeted Saudi cities and critical oil infrastructure.
Qatar, for its part, has much to lose due to its unique relationship with Iran. This relationship enables Doha to reap enormous profits, often exceeding those of Tehran itself, from the shared South Pars/North Dome gas field. Moreover, without a “rogue state” in their immediate neighbourhood, countries like Qatar risk losing some of their strategic value to the United States, both as security partners hosting American troops and as key mediators in regional conflicts.
Beyond Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Oman also views the fall of the Iranian regime as undesirable. Muscat has traditionally maintained friendly relations with Tehran and has repeatedly served as a trusted mediator between Iran, its regional rivals, and Western powers.
The greatest fear, however, is the potential spillover of instability into Iran’s neighbouring states, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the South Caucasus. The emergence of separatist conflicts or the further destabilisation of already fragile states would have profound consequences for the security of the wider region. This is a scenario that neither Turkey nor the Gulf monarchies are willing to risk.
Ultimately, both Turkey and the Arab states are well acquainted with the Islamic Republic and have learned how to coexist with it. Even in the absence of widespread anarchy or political violence, the aftermath of regime collapse in Iran would remain deeply uncertain. For Iran’s neighbours, a predictable, if weakened, regime in Tehran is preferable to an unknown and potentially far more dangerous alternative. Thus, while Turkey and Saudi Arabia are by no means supporters of the Islamic Republic, they clearly prefer the continued existence of a weakened theocratic regime to the prospect of chaos and anarchy.
