President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s back-to-back visits to Riyadh (3 February) and Cairo (4 February) highlight the continuing normalisation of Turkey’s relations with two of the most influential Arab states. For much of the previous decade, Ankara’s ties with both Saudi Arabia and Egypt were marked by deep political tensions, driven primarily by Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Erdoğan’s broader effort to expand Turkish influence across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
Over roughly the last two and a half years, however, relations have steadily improved. A growing number of diplomatic exchanges and the signing of key agreements, including in the defence sector, have signalled a gradual but consistent rapprochement. Moreover, developments such as the conflict trajectories in Gaza, Sudan, and Syria accelerated this trend by reinforcing shared security concerns and encouraging closer coordination.
What has changed more recently is the emergence of a new strategic challenge.
An increasingly visible alignment between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is widely viewed in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt as detrimental to their regional interests. This perception has contributed to a noticeable acceleration in diplomatic and security cooperation among the three states and their allies.
During his visit to Saudi Arabia, the Turkish president met with Crown Prince and de facto ruler Mohammed bin Salman. In a joint declaration, the two leaders implicitly criticised Emirati policies and more openly condemned Israel’s regional actions, particularly in Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and Syria. Their shared concerns focused on several developments: Israel’s recognition of the breakaway Republic of Somaliland; attempts to divide Yemen (implying UAE support for southern separatists); the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces; and Israel’s expanded occupation of Syrian territory beyond the Golan Heights.
Within this context, Ankara and Riyadh agreed to expand military and defence cooperation.
Saudi Arabia’s stance reflects broader strategic priorities. Stability across neighbouring regions is seen in Riyadh as essential to safeguarding domestic security, particularly given the kingdom’s direct exposure to developments in Yemen, where cross-border attacks have previously threatened Saudi territory. At the same time, Saudi policymakers remain cautious about any scenario that could enable Israel to achieve overwhelming regional dominance. These concerns help explain Saudi Arabia’s coordination with Turkey both in supporting Ahmed al-Sharaa in Syria and in opposing the recognition of Somaliland. As a result, Saudi and Turkish threat perceptions are increasingly converging.
Turkey’s improving relationship with Egypt follows a similar logic. Erdoğan’s meeting with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Cairo produced tangible outcomes, including a defence agreement that may influence the evolving strategic balance in the Eastern Mediterranean and surrounding regions. Cooperation between the two countries is also evident in Sudan, where both support the Sudanese Armed Forces against the RSF. For Egypt, maintaining a unified Sudan is strategically important, as Khartoum could serve as a valuable partner in Cairo’s dispute with Ethiopia over the controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). For Turkey, Sudan forms part of a broader effort to maintain influence along the Red Sea corridor and to prevent the emergence of a UAE-centred geopolitical arc extending from the Horn of Africa to North Africa.
Somalia represents another key point of cooperation. Turkey’s extensive investments there reflect Ankara’s intention to maintain a long-term presence and prevent further institutional weakening of the Federal Government of Somalia, particularly in light of Israeli and Emirati involvement. Egypt’s interest in Somalia is shaped largely by its rivalry with Ethiopia, especially Addis Ababa’s attempts to secure maritime access through Somaliland. Supporting Somalia’s territorial integrity, therefore, serves the strategic objectives of both Ankara and Cairo.
Taken together, these developments are contributing to a gradual reconfiguration of regional alignments. States that were recently positioned on opposing sides of several geopolitical disputes are now finding common ground as new pressures emerge. The perceived expansion of Israel–UAE cooperation across multiple regional theatres is seen by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other regional actors as a potentially destabilising factor, prompting greater coordination among them.
Erdoğan’s recent diplomatic engagements in Riyadh and Cairo should thus be interpreted less as symbolic reconciliation and more as part of a broader effort to establish a framework of cooperation and strategic balancing among the three countries and their regional partners.
